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Rollyson: Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations: Limitations on the Scope of th

NOTES
CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: LIMITATIONS ON
THE SCOPE OF THE SECTION 7602 SUMMONS*
Although every individual is subject to examination by the Internal
Revenue Service concerning the correct payment of any federal tax, few
realize the danger of criminal prosecution in such an investigation. By relinquishing his tax records to an Internal Revenue agent or assisting in a
review of such records a taxpayer may reveal sufficient evidence to support a
criminal prosecution. Although this threat of criminal sanction always exists,
constitutional protections normally extended to an accused have generally
been denied in tax investigations because the examination is deemed both
"civil" and "criminal" in nature.
Since the examination is considered civil, the courts have consistently
permitted use of an administrative summons to gather evidence in furtherance of the investigation.' The taxpayer who will not voluntarily produce
records for examination may be compelled by the Service to relinquish records
that may lead to criminal conviction.' In recent years, however, the United
States Supreme Court has emphasized that criminal investigations must be
conducted with a sense of fair play, and the use of the administrative process to aid in criminal investigations will be closely scrutinizedA Since the
hybrid civil-criminal nature of tax examinations invites abuse of the administrative summons, commentators and some courts have urged tighter controls
on the Service's inquisitorial investigations.4 However, the issuance of a summons has been used with increasing frequency by the Service to gather
evidence for use in criminal prosecution, or to determine whether criminal
action should be initiated against the taxpayer. This note will discuss the
Internal Revenue Service's summons power and examine the grounds upon
which the taxpayer may challenge the issuance and enforcement of a section
7602 summons.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE SUMMONS POWER AND PROCEDURE

The Internal Revenue Service is empowered to summon any books, papers,
records, or other relevant data in order to: (1) ascertain the correctness of any
return, (2) make a return where none has been made, (3) determine the
liability of any person for any Internal Revenue tax, and (4) collect any
*EDrrOR'S NoTs This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the spring 1972 quarter.
1. See United States v. Mothe, 303 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. La. 1969) and cases cited therein.
2. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, §7602 (1); see note 5 infra.
3. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 323 (1967); Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960).
4. E.g., United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968, 974-75 (C.D. Cal. 1969); see, e.g.,
Andres, The Right To Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under Escobedo and
[114]
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such liability.5 Although the Service possesses this seemingly pervasive
power to summon an individual's records, the power is seldom utilized during
a routine audit.6 When a taxpayer is selected for audit he is first contacted
by a revenue agent whose duty is merely to determine the taxpayer's correct
tax liability. The taxpayer is usually willing to cooperate because he feels
such cooperation will lead to a favorable settlement. Since less than threetenths of one per cent of all audited returns advance beyond the civil deficiency state,7 he may be correct in his assumption. If the taxpayer were
aware of the potential criminal prosecutions that may result from this examination, however, he might not relinquish his private records so willingly.
In addition to this unawareness of potential criminal prosecution, few
taxpayers realize the distinction between a revenue agent and a special agent,
or the change that has occurred in the nature of an investigation in which
a special agent is participating. A revenue agent is not empowered to investigate criminal tax fraud. If his examination reveals evidence of fraud, he must
suspend the examination and refer the matter to the Service's Intelligence
Division.8 Upon referral a special agent is assigned to make a preliminary investigation, 9 which in most cases results in a determination that further
action is not justified1o However, if a full-scale investigation is deemed necessary it is conducted jointly by a special agent and a revenue agent. The
revenue agent is responsible for determining the correct civil liability and the
special agent coordinates the investigation and development of evidence to
Miranda: The "Critical Stage," 58 IowA L. REv. 1074 (1968); Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts To Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1
(1966); Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44
TAXES 660 (1966); Note, Extending Miranda to Administrative Investigations, 56 VA. L. REv.

690 (1970).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7602 (1).
6. See B. GEORGE, DEFENDING TAX FRAUD PROSECUTIONs 42 (1970). "The policy of the
Service respecting the issuance of a summons by special agents is very specific. First, all
testimony, records, etc. should be obtained on a voluntary basis, if possible. Secondly, a
summons should be used very sparingly--only when absolutely necessary and only when
enforcement action will be taken in the event the summons is not honored."
7. Duke, supra note 4, at 85.
8. See United States v. Ruggeiro, 800 F. Supp. 968 (C.D. Cal. 1969); United States v.
Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968); Lipton, Constitutional Protection for Books and
Records in Tax Fraud Investigations, N.Y.U. 29TrH INST. ON FED. TAX 948, 972 n.96 (1971);
"If during an investigation the agent discovers what he believes to be an indication of
fraud, he will immediately suspend his investigation . . . and report his findings in
"
writing to the Chief of the Audit Division through his group supervisor ....
9. See Statement of Organization and Functions, 80 Fed. Reg. 9899-9400 (July 28, 1965)
promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service: "1118.6 Intelligence Division. The Intelligence Division enforces the criminal statutes applicable to income, estate, gift, employment,
and excise tax laws . . . by developing information concerning alleged criminal violations
thereof, evaluating allegations and indications of such violations to determine investigations
to be undertaken, investigating suspected criminal violations of such laws, recommending
prosecution when warranted, and measuring effectiveness of the investigation and prosecution processes."
10. In 1968 the Intelligence Division evaluated 123,000 information items and conducted 10,000 preliminary investigations; 2,900 fuHll scale investigations resulted from the
10,000 preliminary investigations. B. GEORGE, supra note 6, at 65.
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permit an informed decision on whether criminal prosecution should be
recommended. 1
During any of these stages of investigation, whether it is the routine audit,
the preliminary investigation by the Intelligence Division, or the full-scale
joint investigation, the agents may issue a summons requiring the taxpayer
12
to produce his books, papers, records, and any other relevant materials.
Procedure for Objecting to a Section 7602 Summons
It is not mandatory that a taxpayer comply with a section 7602 summons,
but he is precluded from seeking pre-enforcement relief.1 3 Instead, he must

appear at the time and place of the scheduled examination,' 4 and may then
object to the validity of the summons and refuse to divulge the summoned
information.15 In Reisman v. Caplinle taxpayer's attorneys sought declaratory
and injunctive relief from a summons issued to taxpayer's accounting firm to
produce all audit reports, work papers, and correspondence pertaining to taxpayer's business interest. The Court concluded an adequate remedy existed at
law and dismissed the suit for want of equity. 17 However, the Court did
establish procedures to be followed in objecting to such a summons, s and
stated a good faith refusal to comply may be asserted without incurring risk
of sanction for noncompliance.' 9 Upon such refusal the Service must make
application to the district court for enforcement.20 The enforcement proceeding provides the taxpayer with an appealable judicial determination of
2
the validity of the summons. '
11. See B. GEORGE, supra note 6, at 33.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7602 (2).
13. Reisman v. Caplin, 376 U.S. 440 (1964).
14. "The time and place of examination... shall be such time and place as may be
fixed by the Secretary or his delegate and as are reasonable under the circumstances ....
[T]he date fixed for appearance . . . shall not be less than 10 days from the date of the

summons."

INT.

REv.

CODE

Or 1954, §7605 (a).

15. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 443.
18. A person summoned must appear at the time and place specified and may then
interpose challenges to the summons' validity. If the challenges are rejected by the
hearing officer and the witness still refuses to testify or produce, the examiner is given no
power to enforce compliance or to impose sanction for non-compliance. However, if the
person summoned fails "to appear or produce," he is subject to fine or imprisonment or
both under §7210. Prosecution under §7210 may not be maintained, however, if the
person appears and interposes good faith challenges to the summons.
If the Service wishes to enforce the summons, it must proceed under §7402 (b), granting
jurisdiction to the district courts to compel testimony or production. In the enforcement
proceeding, only a refusal to comply with an order of the district judge subjects the
person to contempt proceedings. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445-47 (1964). See Bender,
The Implications of Reisman v. Caplin in Fraud Cases, N.Y.U. 23D INST. ON Fm. TAX. 1293
(1965).
19. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 447 (1964).
20. Enforcement may be sought under § §7402 (b), 7604 (a); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S.
440, 445-46 (1964); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§7402(b), 7604 (a).
21. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S., 440, 446 (1964).
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A frequent problem in objecting to a section 7602 summons arises when
the documents summoned are not within the taxpayer's possession or when
a person other than the taxpayer is summoned. In such cases the taxpayer
may challenge the validity of the summons only if he is permitted to intervene in the administrative process. The Reisman Court held that if a thirdparty witness indicates an intention to comply with a summons, the taxpayer may intervene and raise the same objections to the validity of the
summons as if it were directed to himself.22
In Donaldson v. United States, 23 however, the Court held the right of intervention in such cases is only permissive, not mandatory,24 despite the taxpayer's contention that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a) (2)25 granted
intervention as a matter of right. The rule implies those having an interest
relating to the property that is the subject of the action may intervene. The
Court, however, said the phrase "an interest relating to the property" refers
to a "significantly protectable interest" and such interest was not present in
the case sub judice.26 Although the term "significantly protectable interest"
was not explicitly defined, the Court said such an interest might exist by way
of privilege, or to the extent "abuse of process" exists.27 Intervention is
thus precluded unless the intervenor can show the records summoned are
22. Id. at 450.
23. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
24. In Reisman the Court had stated: "Mhat both parties summoned and those
affected by a disclosure may appear or intervene before the District Court and challenge
the summons by asserting their constitutional or other claims." Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U.S. 440, 445 (1964). While this language would seem to grant taxpayer intervention as
a matter of right, Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Donaldson court, interpreted it as
permissive only and left the question of intervention to the discretion of the district court.
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 529 (1971).
Three circuits had interpreted Reisman as giving a taxpayer the right of intervention
simply because it is his tax liability that is the subject of the summons. United States v.
Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405
F.2d 931, 933 (3d Cir. 1969); Justice v. United States, 365 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1966).
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the opposite conclusion reached by the First,
Second, and Fifth Circuits. United States v. Donaldson, 418 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir.
1969); O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43, 44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 969 (1966);
In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.. 950 (1965).
25. FED. R. Crv. P. 24 (a) (2) states: "(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action; (2) When the applicant claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is
so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."
26. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). The Court apparently concedes that a literal reading of rule 24(a) (2) would give taxpayer the right to intervene,
since it relies on rule 81 (a) (3) to limit the application of rule 24 (a) (2). Id. at 528. "Rule

81. Applicability in General (a) To what proceedings available (3) .... These rules apply
to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance
with a subpoena issued . . . by an agency of the United States . . . except as otherwise
provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the court in the proceedings." FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (a) (3).
27. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
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within his fifth amendment privilege, subject to the attorney-client privilege
or that the court's process has been abused.28- The Court further indicated its
disapproval of liberal intervention, stating the taxpayer may always assert
9
these interests in due course at their "proper place in any subsequent trial."2
A contrary holding would have allowed the taxpayer to intervene on all
summonses issued to third parties and appeal each court's decision. The
Court felt liberal intervention would be devastating to the Service's collection
of the revenue. Subsequent decisions indicate intervention will seldom be
granted and the Donaldson rationale will be followed. 30 Since a summons is
usually issued only when criminal fraud is suspected, however, it would not
seem burdensome in light of the potential penalties to allow the taxpayer to
intervene to protect his interests.
LITATIONS ON ISSUANCE OF A SECTION 7602 SUMMONS

Although literally section 7602 appears to encompass every taxpayer and
any of his records, other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code limit its
scope to some degree. Additionally, the summons power is always subordinate
to the taxpayer's constitutional guarantees. Furthermore, courts have placed
restrictions upon the use of a 7602 summons when it will apparently be used
solely to gather evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.
Statutory Limitations
Despite the broad purposes for which the Service may issue a summons
pursuant to section 7602,31 Congress has placed certain restrictions upon both
the time and the reasons a summons may be issued. Section 7605 (b) of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that no taxpayer is to be subject to unnecessary examination or investigation, allowing only one examination for
each taxable year unless an authorized Internal Revenue officer notifies the
taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary. 32 The scope of
the "one examination" limitation is uncertain and has often required judicial
determination. For example, subsequent visits are not considered second
examinations if at the first visit the taxpayer did not furnish all the records
necessary to complete the examination. 3 3 Also, if the investigation is classified
28. In Donaldson the documents summoned were those of the taxpayer's former employers. Although the documents concededly were of significance for federal income tax
purposes, they were not within either the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination or the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 530. Seemingly, the district courts will
have to rule on whether the materials are privileged to determine whether the taxpayer
will be allowed to intervene. Such a procedure will prevent the taxpayer from appealing
adverse decisions on the privileged nature of the materials.
29. Id. at 531.
30. United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. White,
326 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
31. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7602 (1).
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7605 (b).
33. United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037
(1970) (on the first visit the taxpayer did not produce the accounts receivable, cash
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as "continuing," additional inspections will not be considered second examinations requiring written notice s 4 In United States v. Crespo35 investigation
of taxpayer's books was being performed by two revenue agents. One agent
had examined taxpayer's books and records sufficiently to complete his report
for the taxable year ended March 31, 1963. The second agent, however, had
not completed his reports for the years ended March 31, 1964, and March 31,
1965. The Court held that the' examination was continuing for the years
1964 and 1965 and a subsequent inspection of these years would not amount
to a second inspection within the meaning of section 7605 (b).3G
If a second examination within the meaning of section 7605 (b) occurs, the
taxpayer must make a timely objection to such examination or he will be
deemed to have waived the requirement of written notice.37 When a timely
protest is entered, however, the court may either refuse to enforce a summons
issued for a second examination or grant another appropriate remedy.38 Since
section 7605 (b) was designed to protect only the taxpayer from harassment
by prolonged or repeated investigations, it does not apply to summonses
issued to compel production of documents in the possession of a third person.39
Thus, where a taxable year has been examined and closed and a deficiency
assessed, further investigation may still be made of records in the hands of
a third party.40

disbursements, and other necessary underlying journals and documents. When the taxpayer's attorney notified the agent that such documents would not be produced, the agent
issued summons requiring production of such documents); Application of Magnus, Mabee
& Raynard, Inc., 299 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1962) (summons issued to third person after preliminary examination of taxpayer's records); see National Plate & Window Glass Co. v.
United States, 254 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1958).
34. United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928, 934 (D. Md. 1968).
35.

Id.

36. Id. By implication, notice would have been required if the agents sought to further
examine the books and records pertaining to the year ended March 31, 1963.
37. Lessman v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 990, 996 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v.
O'Conner, 237 F.2d 466, 477 (2d Cir. 1956).
38. Reineman v. United States, 301 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1962) (deficiency assessment was
set aside, since discovered in violation of §7605 (b)); Application of Leonardo, 208 F. Supp.
124 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (suppressing evidence whether in the form of testimony by the agents
or in the form of their notes and memoranda and restraining United States Attorney from
using such evidence as the basis for any subsequent criminal tax prosecution).
39. Hall v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); Hinchfield v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967); Guerkink v. United States, 354 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1965)

(neither examination of corporate books and records of which taxpayer is the sole shareholder nor examination of other records in hands of the Commissioner is a reexamination
within §7605 (b)); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); DeMasters v.
Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963); United States v. Crespo, 281
F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968).
40. Hinchfield v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967) (taxpayer could not object when agent had requested taxpayer's accountant to produce work
papers pertaining to "open" years only, but papers received included workpapers of prior
years leading to a summons issued to the accountant for production of all workpapers).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/4

6

Rollyson: Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations: Limitations on the Scope of th
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. XXV

In addition to the one examination limitations, section 7605 (b) unequivocably states that no taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examinations or investigations.41 However, since the Commissioner's powers and
duties in collecting the revenues are extremely broad, the possibility of an
examination being held unnecessary seems virtually precluded. 42 An investigation is not deemed unnecessary if it contributes to the accomplishment of
43
any purpose for which the Commissioner is authorized to make inquiry.
Since two such purposes are to ascertain the correctness of any return and
to determine the tax liability of any person, 44 a first examination will rarely
be held unnecessary.

45

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Constitutional challenges to the use of section 7602 summonses pre-

dominate in recent criminal tax cases. Although the taxpayer's right to be
advised of his fifth amendment privilege set forth in Miranda v. Arizona46
has received the most attention 4 7 the fourth and sixth amendments also
provide extensive protection.
Fourth Amendment Protection
The fourth amendment 48 is applicable to the Internal Revenue Service
during a tax investigation and may limit the Service's use of the 7602 summons. 49 However, the question of what constitutes an unreasonable search or
seizure has recently prompted extensive litigation.
Apparently the papers of the dosed years would not have been subject to the summons had
they been in taxpayer's possession. Thus, after a Service examination has been completed
the accountant should transfer all workpapers to the client if they are no longer necessary
to the performance of the accountant's services.
41.
42.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7605 (b).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7601 (a). "General

Rule -The

Secretary or his delegate

shall to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of the Treasury
Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal
revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects
with respect to which any tax is imposed."
43. DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 986 (1963).
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7602.
45. DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963);
Application of Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding the
prohibition applies only to inquiries made of the taxpayer personally and not to inquiries
made to third persons). But see United States v. Pritchard, 438 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 929 (1970) (dismissing the enforcement proceeding where the Government made no showing that the documents were not already within the Service's possession).
46. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47. See text accompanying notes 129-160 infra.
48. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
49. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1972], Art. 4

1972]

CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS

Misrepresentation. Although a summons issued pursuant to section 7602
may not be unconstitutional on its face; fraud, trickery, or deceit in obtaining
access to incriminating evidence can make an otherwise lawful search unreasonable. If a summons is issued to secure documents whose existence became known through an unlawful search, the documents will be protected
by the fourth amendment. 50
The nature of the ordinary tax investigation generally precludes the
possibility of an unreasonable search or seizure occurring in the usual
manner. No need ordinarily exists for secretive or forceful coercion, since
the taxpayer is usually willing to cooperate thinking such cooperation will
enhance the likelihood of a favorable settlement. Cooperation or consent to
inspection may constitute a waiver of any constitutional rights the taxpayer
could have asserted.51 Where the taxpayer has not voluntarily waived his
rights, however, tie use of fraud, trickery, or deceit to obtain evidence for
use in a subsequent criminal prosecution will require that evidence be sup52
pressed.
What constitutes a voluntary waiver by the taxpayer or a misrepresentation by the agent has become a litigious question. Apparently, the failure
to disclose the duties of a special agent53 as opposed to those of a revenue
agent 5 ' does not constitute misrepresentation55 In United States v. Prudden56
the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding that the agents had engaged in a deliberate scheme to deceive the taxpayer in order to prevent his
suspecting that the nature of the investigation had altered materially.-r The
court held that letters written after referral to the Intelligence Division, which
did not reveal the referral, friendliness of the agents, and promises of advice
from the agents did not constitute fraud, deceit, or trickery. 58 The court
decided the agents had not concealed anything, but had merely identified
themselves.50. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
51. See United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d 941, 942 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
975 (1965); Bowles v. Sachnoff, 65 F. Supp. 538, 547 (W.D.. Pa. 1946).

52. United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970) (although finding no such fraud, deceit, or trickery in the instant case, the court
explicitly rejected the government's contention that the agents were free to use fraud,
deceit, or trickery in obtaining taxpayers' consent to examine documents); Goodman v.
United States, 285 F. Supp. 245 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
53. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
54. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
55. United States v. Tonahill, 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970);
United States V. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Spahr
v. United States, 409 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959); United States v. Decker, 311 F. Supp. 1223 (WM.
Mo. 1970); see Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1955).
56. 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
57. Id. at 1032.
58. Id. at 1035 (note, however, the court emphasized that Prudden was a law school
graduate and security analyst for a member firm of the New York Stock Exchange). But cf.
Goodman v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 245 (CD. Cal. 1968).
59. United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
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Expanding the Service's right to examine without a full disclosure of the
nature of the investigation, the Fifth Circuit apparently condoned the practice of concealing the criminal nature of the investigation in United States
v. Tonahill6O and now requires a showing of a "material misrepresentation
which clearly and convincingly shows fraud .. ..",61 In Tonahill neither defendant nor his accountant knew the significance of the term "Special
Agent" and asked several times why the audit was taking so long and
whether fraud was involved. 6 2 Rather than disclose the criminal nature of
the investigation, the agents merely replied that "their function was to reconcile the large discrepancies, to see if they were the result of innocent errors."6 3
The court held this misrepresentation was immaterial and thus did not
clearly and convincingly show fraud.64
At least one federal court has suppressed evidence gathered by an agent
who intentionally misled the taxpayer and affirmatively represented to the
taxpayer that he was investigating other taxpayers.65 Active misrepresentation
has also been found where a special agent told the taxpayer that he was not
pursuing his usual kind of assignment, but rather was conducting a routine
civil audit. 66 Similarly, if a special agent has a revenue agent secure docu67
ments for him, it would seemingly constitute a material misrepresentation.
If a revenue agent uncovers evidence of fraud he is required to cease his
examination and refer the case to the Intelligence Division for possible
criminal prosecution.-8 To continue collecting incriminating evidence without
alerting the taxpayer to the new dimensions of the investigation would
arguably constitute a material misrepresentation in violation of the fourth
amendment. The courts, however, have consistently refused to suppress evidence gathered by a revenue agent who delayed referral, holding such delays
do not constitute active misrepresentation.69 Similarly, courts have refused to
(1970).
60. 430 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
61. Id. at 1045.
62. Id. at 1044.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1045. Note the court dropped the use of the terms "trickery" and "deceit"
from its formula for obtaining consent by unreasonable means. If the special agent's response as to the nature of his investigation is compared with the duties of a special agent
set forth in note 9 supra, it seems the court is condoning fraudulent practices. See note 9
supra.
65. Goodman v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 245 (C.D. Cal. 1968). In Goodman v.
United States, 369 F.2d 166, 169 (9th Cir. 1966), the Government conceded that if the
records were obtained pursuant to a scheme of deception and fraud, the seizures were unlawful.
66. United States v. Moon, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119491 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (evidence gathered
after the taxpayer had obtained counsel was not suppressed however, since the attorney admitted he had considered the possibility that the audit might lead to a criminal prosecution).
67. United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
68. See authorities cited note 8 supra.
69. United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959).
The court stated a taxpayer surely knows that contained in an openly commenced "routine"
tax investigation there is inherently a warning that the government's agents will pursue
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suppress evidence gathered by revenue agents initially assigned to an investigation even though informants had previously related to the Service that
criminal activities had transpired7 ° Thus, while active misrepresentation by
agents will be considered an unlawful search and seizure, the courts have
condoned practices that materially, if not actively, misrepresent the investigation.
Probable Cause. When the Internal Revenue Service seeks an enforcement
order from the district court, the protection of the individual's right of privacy
must be weighed against the public interest in the inspection.- Although the
72
administrative summons per se does not violate the fourth amendment,
recent decisions have indicated the nature of the search authorized by the
summons must be closely examined. Those aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime must show a high degree of necessity or probable cause.73
Showing of probable cause, however, need not be made for issuance of a 7602
summons, 74 since the Treasury's responsibility to collect revenue and the
public's interest in the performance of this duty justify the limited intrusion upon the individual's right to privacy.7 5 Despite these factors, however, it would not seem overly burdensome upon the Service to require a
showing of probable cause if the investigation has become criminally
76
oriented.
Such a procedure would make the taxpayer more acutely aware of the
nature of the investigation and permit him to make a more intelligent decision whether to waive his constitutional protections. In Donaldson v. United
States,77 however, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had authorized
the use of the 7602 summons in investigating potentially criminal conduct.
The Court refused to take notice of the emphasis on collection of criminal

evidence of misreporting and held "moreover it is unrealistic to suggest that the Government
could or should keep a taxpayer advised as to the direction in which its necessarily
fuctuating investigations lead." Id. at 415; United States v. Decker, 311 F. Supp. 1223
(W.D. Mo. 1970); see Badger Meter Mfg. Co. v. Brennan, 216 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
70. United States v. Davis, 424 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
But some cases have required the nature of the investigation or possibility of prosecution be
made dear to the taxpayer where evidence indicated the possibility of criminal fraud from
the outset. See United States v. Wheeler, 149 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Pa. 1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 256 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1958).
71. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213 (1946).
72. Id. at 214.
73. Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959). In Frank the Court repeatedly stated that evidence for use in criminal prosecutions may not be taken without a search warrant. A search warrant may be issued only upon
a showing of probable cause and prior approval of a judge or magistrate. Id. at 363, 365-66.
See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 48 (1964); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
74. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
75. Id.
76. Only about 2,000 full-scale criminal fraud investigations are undertaken each year.
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 535 n.17 (1971); B. GEORE, supra note 6, at 65.
77. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
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evidence occurring when a special agent enters the case. 7s If the entry of the
special agent were recognized as the initiation of a criminal investigation, the
Donaldson Court felt the Service would be forced to "forego either the use of
the summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution."' 9 This would not necessarily be the result, however, since the summons could be issued even though a special agent were investigating, if a
standard of necessity or probable cause were met.
The Improper Purpose Test. Although recent decisions indicate increased
fourth amendment protection for the taxpayer by holding issuance of a
summons to collect evidence for criminal prosecution would not be tolerated,
these holdings have continued to place the public interest in the uninterrupted collection of revenue above the individual's right to be free from
unreasonable searches.80 In Reisman v. Caplins' the Supreme Court indicated that a taxpayer could challenge a summons issued under section 7602
on any appropriate grounds, including "that the material is sought for the
8 2
improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.."
Although taxpayers have repeatedly relied upon this dictum in challenging the
validity of summonses, lower courts have consistently refused to find an improper purpose.8 3
Ten months after Reisman the Court in United States v. Powells- indicated the improper purpose test would not be liberally applied, holding the
fact that the statute of limitations had run on ordinary tax liability was insufficient to show an abuse of the Court's process.85 The decision, however,
reiterated that a court should not allow its process to be abused by issuing a
summons for an improper purpose such as harassment, coercion, or for any
other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation. 86
Furthermore, the Commissioner must show that the investigation will be
conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose. s7
While Powell appears to give taxpayers greater protection from an Internal
Revenue Service summons by imposing a good faith restriction on the Service,
the lower courts have concentrated on the existence of a legitimate purpose.
Thus, even where the primary purpose of a summons is to further a criminal

78. Id.
79. Id. at 535-36.
80. See United States v. Mothe, 303 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. La. 1969), and cases cited
therein.
81. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
82. Id. at 445.
83. See United States v. Mothe, 303 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. La. 1969), and cases cited
therein. Contra United States v. O'Conner, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).
84. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
85. Although Powell did not specifically claim the improper purpose, the Court's additional finding that the examination was not unnecessary within the meaning of §7605 (b)
indicates a claim of improper purpose would not have succeeded. Id. at 58.
86. Id.
87.

Id. at 57.
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investigation, the secondary purpose of determining civil tax liability is a
sufficient legitimate purpose to uphold issuance.88 Every federal circuit facing
the issue has held the existence of an improper purpose does not negate a
proper purpose if they both exist.8 9 Since determination of tax liability is a
legitimate purpose, it would be virtually impossible, under the circuit courts'
interpretations of Reisman and Powell, to prevent issuance of a summons
because of an improper purpose.90
The Court further emasculated the Reisman dictum in Donaldson v.
United States.91 The Court held under section 7602 an Internal Revenue
summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good
faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 92 The majority interpreted Reisman to be limited to investigations solely for the purpose of gathering incriminating evidence that "would likely be the case
where a criminal prosecution has been instituted and is pending . . . 93
Although lower federal courts had previously conflicted on the question

88. United States v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970).
Apparently no test of good faith issuance will be made despite the Court's stipulation of
such in Powell. See also Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966) (special agent
alone was conducting investigation). Some courts have used the existence of a revenue agent
in an investigation to support the existence of a legitimate purpose and thereby negate any
improper purpose. United States v. Schoendorf, 307 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
89. See cases cited in United States v. Mothe, 303 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. La. 1969).
90. Despite the fact that the existence of a special agent intimates a search for information to be used in a criminal prosecution, investigation by such an agent does not make it
improper. Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966). But see United States v.
Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aJ'd 425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970). District
Judge Real, though upholding the petition for enforcement of the summons because of
circuit court holdings, points out the senseless rhetoric in which the decisions have been
couched: "To say that a summons is not being used for an improper purpose unless the
existence of a proper civil purpose is absent . . .simply begs the question. All criminal
tax investigations to be prosecutable require the 'proper civil purpose' of determination
of tax liability." Judge Real would interpret Reisman and Powell strictly to mean a 7602
summons cannot be used for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. If it were shown a special agent was ascertaining tax liability as one of the steps
in determining whether a criminal violation exists, then the summons should not be
enforced. Id. at 975.
91. 400 US. 517 (1971). The Court held the taxpayer had no right to intervene in
the proceeding, but attempted to clarify the Reisman improper purpose test.
92. Id. at 520.
93. Id. at 533. The dictum in Reisman included a citation to Boren v. Tucker, 239
F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956), which held the Service need not refrain from issuing a 7602
summons simply because criminal prosecution was a possibility; and while conceding the
Court should not lend its support to the use of an unrestricted administrative subpoena
power, found no such use in the instant case. The Tucker decision agreed with, but distinguished United States v. O'Conner, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953), which refused to
enforce a subpoena where the taxpayer was presently under an indictment for tax fraud
and the Department of Justice had suggested that the subpoena be used by the special
agent to aid the Government in the preparation of the pending criminal case. The special
agent admitted at least one of his purposes was to aid the Department of Justice in the
prosecution of the criminal case.
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whether a pending prosecution precluded issuance of a section 7602 summons, 94 Donaldson appears to establish that a recommendation for prosecution is the point beyond which a summons may not be issued. 95 Lower courts
have interpreted Donaldson to say that if a recommendation for prosecution
occurs after issuance of the summons, but before compliance, an enforcement
order will not be granted. 96
The good faith requirement of Powell was reiterated in Donaldson. It
will apparently be limited, however, to cases where the taxpayer has been
harassed or coerced into a settlement, 97 and will play little or no role in
determining the validity of a section 7602 summons. 98 Protecting a taxpayer
from summons of his records only after he has been recommended for
prosecution, however, is no protection at all. If a special agent, whose duty it
is to investigate and accumulate evidence of fraud, may use a summons to
gather whatever documents he deems necessary and then transfer such information to the Justice Department, the taxpayer's protection is illusory.
Discovery. Following Donaldson, if a 7602 summons is issued, the taxpayer
should be allowed to conduct discovery proceedings to establish the purpose
for which the summons was issued, or at least to discern if a recommendation for prosecution has been made. 99 The Supreme Court has indicated that
The Court felt the Reisman "improper purpose" dictum must be read in light of both
the above decisions and concluded the dictum applies only to such factual situations as
existed in O'Conner, where a criminal charge was pending or there was "at most . . . an
investigation solely for criminal purposes." Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 533
(1971).
94. United States v. Moriarty, 435 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970); In re Magnus, Mabee &
Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962) (where summons was
issued 10 months prior to indictment, but taxpayer had not yet complied, enforcement order
was issued subsequent to indictment); see United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969) (summons enforced where criminal proceedings had
been recommended, but not forwarded to Justice Department); cf. Venn v. United States,
400 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Application of Myers, 202 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Pa. 1962);
United States v. O'Conner, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).
95. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 586 (1971).
96. United States v. Kyriaco, 826 F. Supp. 1184 (C.D. Cal. 1971). See also United States
v. Monsey, 429 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1970) (considering developments arising after issuance
of the summons).
97. Since the court concludes that Congress has authorized use of the summons to
investigate criminal conduct, seeking incriminating evidence would not constitute a bad
faith use of the summons barring exceptional circumstances. (If recommendation for
prosecution were delayed in order to summons incriminating documents, bad faith would
possibly be a good defense.)
98. United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971) (although citing Donaldson
the court did not make mention of the good faith test and upheld issuance of summons
even though the investigation was begun solely because the taxpayer was on a list of
alleged underworld members and had reported income under the heading of "miscellaneous").
99. Discovery should be granted if the summons is served upon the taxpayer or a
third party and the taxpayer is allowed to intervene. A party is entitled to examine a
deponent on "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action." FFD. R. Civ. P. 26 (b).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure granting discovery are applicable to enforcement proceedings, 0 0 but lower courts have given the trial judge wide
discretion as to the scope of discovery proceedings.1 01 Where the purpose of
the summons is in issue and affects the legality of its issuance, the taxpayer is
given the right to discovery. 10 2 Discovery proceedings, however, must be conducted reasonably' 03 and may not be used to harass the Internal Revenue
104
Service.
Fifth Amendment Privilege
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incriminationI05 clearly protects documents as well as oral evidence. 08 Thus, the Service may not require
a taxpayer to produce self-incriminating documents that he created, owns,
and possesses.' 07 Documents afforded fifth amendment protection in the tax-

100. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528 n.11 (1971); United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 58 n.18 (1964).
101. United States v. Bowman, 435 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Erdner, 422
F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1970) (not an abuse of discretion to deny an oral motion for discovery
when the agent is present at the hearing and available for questioning); see United States
v. Shoendorf, 807 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Wis. 1970); FED. R. Crv. P. 81 (a) n.23.
The most far-reaching step taken by any federal court is the "Omnibus Hearing"
initiated in the Western District of Missouri, which makes available to the accused all
documentary evidence, statements of witnesses, computations, schedules and reports of both
special and revenue agents. Lay, Post Conviction Remedies and the Overburdened Judiciary: Solutions Ahead, 8 CP GRTON L. R1v. 1, 14, 23 (1969); Morris, Criminal Sanctions
of the InternalRevenue Code, CAsE & Com., March-April 1972, at 3.
102. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Nunnally, 278 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Tenn. 1968); see United States v. Moriarty, 278 F. Supp.
187 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Inl. 1966). But see United
States v. Monsey, 429 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1970) (the lower court's holding that discovery
may not be made after an indictment has been filed but before compliance would seem to be
moot in light of Donaldson, since the summons could not be enforced after prosecution
has begun).
103. FED. R. Crv. P. 30 (d).
104. United States v. Nunnally, 278 F. Supp. 843, 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1968).
105. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V, provides in part: "No person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."
106. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Although recent Supreme Court cases
have iterated that only "communicative" or "testimonial" evidence is protected. Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), it is clear
that records prepared by the taxpayer or his employees are within the fifth amendment
privilege. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967), and cases cited therein.
107. However, the taxpayer may not make a blanket refusal to produce the documents
or to testify. He must appear at the time and place summoned and elect on each question
whether to raise the privilege, and the court will consider whether each objection is
well taken. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969).
Although the privilege does not protect records subject to the "required records"
doctrine set forth in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (compelling production of
records required to be kept under the Price Control Act), the Service has refrained from
using the doctrine in tax cases. See Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459, 462 n.2 (5th Cir.
1969). Moreover, recent cases have indicated the courts will be reluctant to apply the re-
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payer's possession are likewise protected when transferred to his attorney. 08
No protection against self-incrimination, however, is provided when documents not owned by the taxpayer are in the hands of a third person. 1 9
Additional problems arise when the Service asserts the taxpayer lacks an
ownership interest in documents within his possession. A majority of the
federal circuits facing .the question have held that mere possession of documents by the taxpayer is insufficient to afford the fifth amendment privilege,
and ownership of such documents is required."1o The issue arises frequently
when the documents are transferred from a third party to the taxpayer during
an investigation or subsequent to the issuance of a summons calling for production of such documents."1
In determining whether the taxpayer or a third party owns documents,
the decisions reiterate the doctrine that if the third party relinquishes all
rights in such documents, they are within the taxpayer's privilege. 1 2 However, establishing the taxpayer's ownership interest in the documents when
they have been transferred during an Internal Revenue Service examination may be difficult. For example, United States v. Zakutansky"3 held assertion of ownership by the taxpayer and the third party transferor are not
binding on the court." 4 In Zakutansky taxpayer's accountant held the docu-

quired records doctrine to an individual's financial records. Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968); see Lipton, Record Keeping and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FEn. TAX. 1331 (1956).
108. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). But see Bouschor v. United
States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
109. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 537 (1971) (Douglas, J. concurring:
"There is no right to be free from incrimination by the records or testimony of others");
Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969) (customers of bank have no standing
to object to subpoenas requiring the bank to produce records of the customer's account).
110. United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Zakutansky,
401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d
739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965); Bouschor v. United States, 316
F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963). These decisions are extensions of the Supreme Court's holdings
in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) and Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911). In White the Court held that an officer of a labor union could not avail himself
of the privilege to avoid producing his union's records despite the fact they might incriminate him. Wilson held a corporate officer could not claim the privilege to avoid
producing his corporation's records. The decisions indicate that a person may not avail
himself of the privilege if he has a duty to surrender the documents to another (that is,
the union members or corporation's stockholders). Thus, the above circuit courts deny the
privilege to a taxpayer in a mere possession of documents, holding he is under a duty to
surrender the documents to the true owner.
111. It is clear that the person to whom a summons is issued cannot be held in contempt if he is unable to produce the object of the summons. United States v. Jacobs, 322
F. Supp. 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1971). But see In re D.I. Operating Co., 240 F. Supp. 672 (D. Nev.
1965) (holding gross inattention to and reckless disregard for the preservation of contested
records can be nothing less than contemptuous).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1021 (1969).
113. 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
114. Id. at 72 and cases cited therein. But see United States v. Levy, 270 F. Supp. 601
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ments until twice subpoened by the Service. The accountant had initially
stated the papers were his, but subsequently transferred the papers to the
taxpayer and denied possessing any interest in the documents. 1 5 The court
held the attempted transfer of ownership was invalid as a mere attempt to
thwart the government's investigation.116 Thus, most decisions are determined
on the bona fides of the transfer and not on notions of ownership and
possession."17 Several decisions have also held the transferor is under a moral,
if not legal, duty to surrender the documents and therefore refuse to recognize the transfer. 8s
A minority of jurisdictions have held that possession, not ownership or time
of transfer, is the determining factor when a taxpayer asserts his privilege
against self-incrimination." 9 In United States v. Cohen 2 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the taxpayer's claim of privilege even though papers
had been transferred the day after a special agent had begun his investigation
2
and despite the transferor's request that the taxpayer return the papers.' '
In examining the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination the court
22rejected the ownership requirement, stating:'
It is possession... not ownership which sets the stage for exercise of
the governmental compulsion which it is the purpose of the privilege
to prohibit. The "cruel trilemma" of perjury, contempt, or selfincrimination, of which the court spoke in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n 23 . . .faces the individual whenever the government seeks
to compel him to produce papers in his possession .
The availability of the privilege against self-incrimination should not be
determined by the fine distinction between possession and ownership. Al(D.Conn. 1967) (where evidence had no convincing force as to who owned the documents,
the summons could not be enforced).
115. United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1021 (1969).
116. Id.
117. United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Zakutansky,
401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d
739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d
451 (8th Cir. 1963).
118. United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021
(1969); see United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (Ist Cir. 1971) ( a post-subpoena transfer
cannot change the character of the papers and thereby defeat a legitimate government
inspection).
119. United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); see Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v. Levy, 270
F. Supp. 601 (D.Conn. 1967); Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966); Application
of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
120. 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 468. The court rebutted the majority's reliance on White and Wilson (see

note 110 supra) by interpreting them merely as an extension of the rule that the privilege
against self-incrimination is available to protect only the personal interest of natural persons and not group interests embodied in impersonal organizations, 14 at 467.
123. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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though the taxpayer's interest in the documents should enter into the granting
or denying of the privilege, it should not be conclusive. Despite the Cohen
court's conclusion that the nature of the right against self-incrimination and
the interests it was intended to protect should be the determining factor,
most courts have continually refused to grant the privilege unless the tax124
payer can prove good faith ownership of the documents.
Nonprivileged Records. The fifth amendment privilege applies only to
personal private documents of the privilege-claimant. In Hale v. Henckels 25
and subsequent cases' 26 the Supreme Court has held that records of a corporation or other impersonal organizations are not subject to the privilege, even
if an individual claiming such privilege has acquired both possession and
title. In addition, it has been uniformly held, despite commentators' criticisms,"'7 that the privilege does not apply to closely or even solely held corpo28

rations.1

Taxpayer's Right to Miranda Warnings Under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments
Since Miranda v. Arizona 29 and Escobedo v. Illinois"3° many commentators have advocated that taxpayers be warned of the potential criminal
implications of tax investigations. 31 In Miranda the Court held statements
124. See note 117 supra. A further problem arises when the taxpayer's attorney is
summoned to produce documents in his possession. Some courts have held the attorney
has no right to assert his client's privilege against self-incrimination. United States v.
Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Bouschor v. United
States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); United
States v. White, 326 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Tex. 1971); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp.
886 (D.N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1960). Contra, United States
v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal.

1956).
125. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
126. See Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 75 (1913); Wheeler v. United States, 226
U.S. 478 (1912); note 110 supra (discussion of White and Wilson). The Government may
also contend that documents prepared by a third party such as a taxpayer's accountant
are not personal, private papers of such taxpayer. United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1967). The personal nature of schedules relating to itemized deductions, income,
and related items, however, would seem to clearly bring such documents within the protection of the privilege. Id.
127. E.g., Lipton & Petrie, Constitutional Safeguards and Corporate Records, N.Y.U.
23D INsT. ON FEn. TAX. 1315, 1325-26 (1965); Ritholz, The Commissioner's Inquisitorial
Power, 45 TAxEs 781, 784 (1967). The only judicial support for the commentators is Judge
Madden's dissent in Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914
(1964).
128. See United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968) and cases cited
therein.
129. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
130. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
131. See, e.g., articles cited note 4 supra.
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solicited from a criminal suspect during a custodial interrogation would be
excluded at trial unless the suspect had been advised of certain constitutional
rights. 3 2 The lower federal courts have held, almost unanimously, that failure
to give Miranda warnings in tax investigations will not lead to suppression
of a taxpayer's statements because the taxpayer is not in custody. 33 Miranda
dearly dealt with one whose freedom of movement had been curtailed, 34 and
such restraints are usually not present at the outset of tax investigations.
The Escobedo decision concentrated not on custodial questioning, but
rather on interrogations after the investigation had begun to focus on a particular suspect and the process had shifted from investigatory to accusatory. 3 5
A majority of courts have distinguished Escobedo from tax investigations
in that the essential question in tax investigations is not who committed a
known crime, but whether in fact any crime has been committed. 36 Moreover, the transfer of an investigation from a revenue agent to a special agent
has been distinguished from the focusing on a particular suspect referred to
37
in Escobedo.
Miranda has been held inapplicable to non-custodial investigations on the
grounds that it would complicate an already difficult administrative task;
would require supplying indigents with attorneys; would hinder efficient collection of taxes; and would be administratively impossible to forewarn the
taxpayer every time the investigation shifts138 Where the taxpayer is put
under oath and questioned by agents, however, the warnings must be given or
the testimony will be suppressed.139
In Mathis v. United States'140 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
government's contention that tax investigations are immune from the
Miranda requirements and held Miranda is applicable to custodial tax in-

132. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A suspect must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation." Id. at 479.
133. E.g., United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968), and cases cited therein;
United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1968) (interrogation at trial attorney's office in the Justice Department and at office of United
States Attorney held not custodial). Contra, United States v. Lackey, 413 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.
1969) (questioning at office of the Internal Revenue Service is custodial interrogation).
134. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 477 (1966).
135. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
136. United States v. Mancuso, 378 F.2d 612 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955
(1968); Selinger v. Bigler, 377 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 904 (1967); Kohatsu
v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
137. United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923
(1968).
138. Id.
139. United States v. Gower, 271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D. Pa. 1967). But see United States v.
Dawson, 400 F.2d 194 -(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1968).
140. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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vestigations. 141 The peculiar circumstances of the case, however, resulted in
the decision having virtually no effect on the lower courts.14 2
In United States v. Dickerson1 4 3 the Seventh Circuit held the Miranda
warnings must be given to the taxpayer after the case has been transferred
to the Intelligence Division. The special agent in Dickerson neither advised
the taxpayer the investigation had become criminally oriented nor informed
him of any of his constitutional rights. The court realistically analyzed the
taxpayer's dilemma and concluded few taxpayers would realize they could
refuse to produce their records or understand the difference between a revenue
agent and a special agent.14 4 Thus, the court concluded:- 5
Incriminating statements elicited in reliance upon the taxpayer's
misapprehension as to the nature of the inquiry, his obligation to respond, and the possible consequences of doing so must be regarded
as equally violative of constitutional protections as a custodial confession extracted without proper warnings.
Subsequent decisions, however, have declined to follow the Dickerson decision.146
Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 949. Prior to and in most cases after
Miranda no warnings were given to the taxpayer when an investigation was
transferred from revenue agents to special agents of the Intelligence Division. 4 However, in 1968 the Service stated in a news release: 14
At the initial meeting with a taxpayer, a Special Agent is now
required to identify himself, describe his function, and advise the taxpayer that anything he says may be used against him. The Special
141. Id. at 4.
142. See United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968), and cases cited therein.
In Mathis the taxpayer was already in jail for a separate offense. See Lipton, Supreme Court's
Decision in Mathis Likely to Have Very Limited Effect, 29 J. TAXATION 32 (1968).
143. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
144. Id. at 1116.
145. Id. at 1116. The Court did not reject the necessity of "custodial interrogation"
but interpreted Miranda as saying: "[O]ne confronted with governmental authority in an
adversary situation should be accorded the opportunity to make an intelligent decision as
to the assertion or relinquishment of those constitutional rights designed to protect him
under precisely such circumstances." Id. at 1114. The court rejected the Kohatsu logic
as to the applicability of Escobedo, saying it is irrelevant whether the culprit be known
before the crime or the crime before the culprit. In either instance the adversary process
has begun and the investigator is attempting to gather evidence against this suspect for
the purpose of criminal prosecution. Id. at 1115; see Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)
(custodial situation may exist in suspect's own bedroom if it appears he is not free to
go where he pleases).
146. United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970), and cases cited therein. But see United States v. Browney, 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.
1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring opinion).
147. See note 133 supra; United States v. Jaskiewcz, 278 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
148. CCH 1968 STAND. FEn. TAX. REP. 6946.
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Agent will also tell the taxpayer that he cannot be compelled to in-criminate himself by answering any questions or producing any documents, and that he has the right to seek the assistance of an attorney
before responding.
140
claims
Since the required procedure exceeds constitutional guarantees,
been
have
procedure
the
with
comply
based upon the agent's failure to
150
held completely devoid of merit.
In United States v. Heffner,'51 however, the court upheld the taxpayer's
claim that the agent must scrupulously observe established rules, regulations,
or procedures 52 The decision rested upon the duty of an agency to follow
its prescribed procedures rather than a constitutional right to warnings.15 It
was immaterial that the instructions were not promulgated into a "regulation"
54
Further, the
or adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act.

court held it was not significant that the procedures or instructions established
by the Internal Revenue Service exceeded constitutional requirements151
Due Process. Although agreeing with Heffner the First Circuit in United
States v. Leahey'" emphasized the "public" nature of the agency, the purpose
of the announced procedures, and the fact that taxpayers may have relied
upon the announcement.157 The court said that after referral to the Intelligence Division, the Service was in effect conducting a criminal investigation
8
and during such investigations the strict rules of due process are applicable'5
149. The vast majority of decisions do not require the Miranda warnings at the time
of referral to a special agent. See United States v. Squeri, 898 F.2d 785, 789-90 (2d Cir. 1968),
and cases cited therein.
150. United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278 F. Supp. 525 (ED. Pa. 1968) (constitutional
rights are a matter for the court, and administrative policies may not be raised to the level
of a constitutional mandate); see United States v. Luna, 313 F. Supp. 1294 (W.D. Tex. 1970)
(administrative agencies may not dictate preconditions for the admissibility of evidence in
a federal trial).
151. 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 811.
154. Id.; see United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 847 U.S. 260 (1954); Administrative Procedure Act, 6 U.S.C. §552 (1966).
155. United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1969); cf. Service v. Dulles,
354 U.S. 363 (1957). The peculiar facts of Heffner must be noted. The taxpayer felt he
had been done an injustice and several previous requests for government aid had gone
unanswered. To get the government's -attention the taxpayer claimed eleven, then twenty
dependents, and then even wrote a letter to the Service notifying them of his claimed
dependents. Upon dismissing the case, the Court recommended defendant not be tried
again.
156. 434 F-9d 7 (1st Cir. 1970).
157. Id. at 10-11.
158. Id. at 9. The Government contended the strict rules of due process do not
apply to investigative proceedings as they do in adjudicatory proceedings. However, the
court found the Service was functioning not as a legislative factfinding agency, but rather
as a police agency performing criminal investigations. Id.; see Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420 (1960) (Civil Rights Commission not bound by the strict rules of due process when
functioning only in an investigatory factfinding capacity).
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However, an agency's failure to follow pronounced procedures will not always
constitute a denial of due process. 5 9 Yet when the procedure is specificially
designed to protect the taxpayer and a public announcement is made, upon
which many taxpayers may reasonably rely, a failure to conform to the procedure will require exclusion of evidence gathered in violation thereof.'1 0
ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Documents not protected by the fourth and fifth amendments may be
withheld from examination if within the attorney-client privilege. The
privilege, however, may not be as extensive as commonly believed and does
not apply to documents simply because they have been turned over to an
attorney. 161
Scope and Policy
Competing considerations are often suggested for determining the scope
of the privilege. Generally, the privilege applies only to communications that
are made to an attorney by the taxpayer as a client seeking legal advice.162
Thus, documents prepared substantially prior to the time the attorney-client
relationship arose are not within the privilege. 6 3 Although an attorney has
drafted a document, it is not privileged if it is neither a confidential communication nor contains any legal advice.16 4 Further restriction of the privilege
has been urged for the purpose of seeking truth and the enforcement of
testimonial duty.165 On the other hand, liberal application has been advocated
because the complexity and difficulty of our laws can only be interpreted by
professional men, therefore making it "absolutely necessary that a man .. .
should have recourse to the assistance of professional lawyers, and . . . it is
159. United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 11 (lst Cir. 1970).
160. Id.
161. See Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
162. The most commonly cited definition of the privilege is that of Judge Wyzanski in
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). The privilege
applies: "[O]nly if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court,
or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either
(i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and
not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client."
163. Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) (holding the privilege may
not be created by simply transferring documents to an attorney after an Internal Revenue
Service audit has begun).
164. In re Kearney, 227 F. Supp. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (bank's attorney conferred with
accountants in course of an investigation and aided in drafting report to support bank's
claim against its insurers).
165. 8 J. WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE §2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
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is equally necessary... that the communications he so makes to him should
be kept secret." 168
Procedure.A blanket refusal to produce or describe documents is not permitted on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. 18 7 The privilege extends
only to the substance of matters communicated to an attorney in professional
confidence; the client identity or the fact that a given individual has become a
client are not matters that an attorney may refuse to disclose, even though
the fact of having retained counsel may be used as evidence against the
client.Gs The answers to such questions better enable the judge to determine
the validity of the taxpayer's claim of privilege.169
Third Parties
The privilege has also been extended to non-lawyers, such as secretaries
or stenographers, when acting as the attorney's agents. 7 0 However, in Himmelfarb v. United States'17 the court found that matters disclosed by the taxpayer
to his attorney in the presence of the accountant employed by the attorney
were not privileged, since the accountant's presence was not indispensable
while that of an attorney's secretary might be.172
In United States v. Kovel,173 however, the Second Circuit held the "presence of an accountant, whether hired by the lawyer or by the client, while
the client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not destroy
the privilege."' 7 4 The court rejected the government's contention that the

166. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
167. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1969).
168. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963). Questions of a general nature such as the date and general nature of services
rendered, or determining whether services were performed in a specific year must also be
answered. Answers to questions as to the nature of services rendered need not be specific,
but may be answered in such general terms as "litigation," "drafting of documents," "tax
advice," et cetera. There is "no question that the giving of tax advice and the preparation
of tax returns . . .are basically matters sufficiently within the professional competence of
an attorney to make them prima facie subject to the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 637.
169. Id.
170. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); see, e.g., 8 J. WIGMOPX, EvIDENCE §2301 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Communications made by the client's agent to an
attorney are also privileged if the other requirements are met. Id. §2317 (l). In Kovel the
decision did not deal with the theory that the taxpayer may be relating information to an
accountant as his agent to transmit the information to an attorney. 296 F.2d 918, 922 n.4
(2d Cir. 1961).
171. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 38 U.S. 860 (1949).
172. Id. at 939.
173. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
174. Id. at 922. The vital requirements of the privilege must still be met. The communications must be made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining legal advice (as
opposed to accounting services only) from the attorney, and not accounting advice from
the accountant.
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privilege remains only when the communication is related to one, other than
175
the attorney, with a menial duty.

The Ninth Circuit apparently overruled Himmelfarb in United States v.
Judson.176 There, a net worth statement and memorandum prepared by an

accountant at an attorney's request were held privileged. Thus, information
initially given to an independent accountant and later transferred to an attorney will usually not be privileged, while that taken to an attorney who
subsequently gives it to an accountant for "interpretation" may be privileged.
The type documents within the scope of the privilege has not been
clearly decided. The courts have generally held that financial transactions
conducted by an attorney with or on behalf of his client,' 77 tax returns prepared for the client by the attorney 7 8 or accounting services performed by
the attorney when he is also an accountant 7 9 are not privileged180 Clearly,
information that is to be included in the taxpayer's tax return is not intended
to be confidential and therefore is not within the privilege.18 ' However, the
question of whether papers and summaries prepared by the client to aid the
attorney in preparation of the client's tax return are privileged is in dispute.
In United States v. Merrelll82 the court held income and expense summaries given to the attorney were of a non-confidential nature and therefore

175. Id. at 921. Decisions relating to communications to agents of the attorney had
previously applied only to persons with menial duties such as secretaries, stenographers, or
interpreters. In Kovel the attorney had directed the client to relate the story to an accountant, employed by the law firm and who specialized in tax law, so that the accountant
could interpret the problem for the attorney, thereby enabling him to better represent
the client. The court found no difference between these facts and an attorney using an
interpreter to relate the story of a client speaking a foreign language. Id. at 922.
176. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). The documents were found to have been prepared
in the course of an attorney-client relationship for the purpose of advising and defending
the client, and the accountant's role was to facilitate an accurate complete consultation
between the client and the attorney. See United States v. Jacobs, 322 F. Supp. 1299 (C.D.

Cal. 1971); Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966).
177. Lowy v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1959); McFee v. United States, 206
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953); Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 857 (1953); Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S.

993 (1953).
178. United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958);
Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957);
United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970); United States v. Merrell, 303
F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969); Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass. 1958).
179. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982
(1957); In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12
F.R.D. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1952).

180. A taxpayer who has an attorney perform his accounting services for him or
handle his business affairs is apparently not in an advantageous position. In Colton v.
United States the court allowed the agents great latitude in discovering what matters were
privileged or unprivileged. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
181. United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970); United States v.
Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
182. 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969).
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not within the privilege.ss In United States v. Schlegel,84 the District Court of
Nebraska held that only information that is subsequently conveyed to the
Government is non-confidential in nature. Furthermore, the fact that the
attorney makes the final decision as to what items are included in the taxpayer's return should not decrease the scope of the privilege. s 5 The Schlegel
decision was grounded upon the desirability of having the taxpayer freely disclose information to his attorney.8 6 The Merrell opinion, however, treats the
transactions as if the information were taken to an accountant. The fact
that non-lawyers (that is, accountants) deal with many questions arising
under the Internal Revenue Code should not shrink the attorney-client privi87
lege in the tax area.
State statutes creating an accountant-client privilege are not applicable
in federal tax fraud investigations. 88 Although it has been contended that the

183. Id. at 493. "The workpapers of Merrell, by definition, consisted of information
that was intended to be transcribed onto the tax returns, and cannot be of a confidential
nature."
184. 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970).
185. Id. at 179. But see Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953). The Schlegel court felt the client intended only so much of the information as the attorney concludes should be sent to the Government to be of a nonconfidential nature. The fact that the attorney decides what is finally included in the
return should not alter the taxpayer's intent. Thus, those items that are not included in
the return should be considered confidential.
186. If the client felt all information given to the attorney would be non-confidential,
the taxpayer would tend to withhold information he deems detrimental. Thus, the client
would be withholding information from the one man professionally qualified to evaluate
it. This clearly violates the spirit of the attorney-client privilege. The court noted, however, the decision did not imply that the client's books and records, as opposed to his
summaries of them, are covered by the privilege. United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp.
177 (D. Neb. 1970).
187. In Schlegel the Government also contended the information was not privileged
due to rule 503 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts
and Magistrates, which states: "(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule ....
(1) .... If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to
commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be
a crime or fraud ....
Id. at 180.
The delivery of two sets of information to the attorney, the second showing less earned
income than the first, was held not sufficient to establish that Schlegel knew or reasonably
should have known that inclusion in an income tax return of the lower set of income
figures would be or would further a fraud or crime. The court rejected the advisory
committee's note, which states: "[N]o preliminary finding that sufficient evidence aside
from the communication has been introduced to warrant a finding that the services were
sought to enable the commission of a wrong is required." Id. at 179.
The court instead held evidence other than the communication itself must be shown
to establish the conditions of the exception. Id. at 180.
188. Commissioner v. Lustman, 322 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1963); Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); United States v. Bowman, 236 F.
Supp. 548 (M.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 421 (1966); Petition of Bordan Co., 75 F. Supp.
857 (N.D. Ill. 1948). The decisions are in disagreement as to why the privilege does not
apply. See Cohen, Accountants' Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations, 21 TAx L. Rv
138 (1965).
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Treasury Department's granting enrolled agents the right to practice before
the Internal Revenue Service creates an accountant-client privilege, the courts
have refused to judicially create an accountant-client privilege equivalent to
the attorney-client privilege18 9
CONCLUSION

The investigative power of the Internal Revenue Service is by nature
inquisitorial and enables the Service to invade the privacy of every person in
the United States. Due to the overriding necessity of collecting revenue, courts
have generally been reluctant to curb the Service's investigative powers even
when it is aimed at criminal prosecution. Furthermore, statutory limitations
have generally proved to be of limited usefulness. The recent, self-imposed
requirement to give the Miranda warnings at the outset of a criminal investigation is encouraging. Whether the courts will enforce the procedures remains
to be seen, but the recent decisions of Heffner and Leahey indicate an increasing judicial awareness of the protections that must be afforded the taxpayer. Not only should a warning be given at the outset of a criminal investigation, but every taxpayer should, at the outset of an Internal Revenue
Service examination be apprised of the potentialities of the investigation. This
would not seriously hinder the Service in its investigations and it would give
each unsuspecting victim a chance to make an intelligent decision whether to
waive his constitutional rights. The Service vigorously prosecutes those cases
that will receive the most notoriety, as fear of prosecution is the main deterrent
to filing false returns. Thus, every taxpayer should enter this adversary situation armed with the knowledge of the possible outcome.
The courts need to abondon the "legitimate purpose" versus "improper
purpose" test and focus on the bona fides of the individual investigation. If
a special agent is present it cannot honestly be disputed that he is seeking incriminating evidence. As is so often stated, the courts should not permit such
an abuse of their process. The time of referral to the Intelligence Division
rather than the time of recommendation for prosecution should be the
terminus for issuing a section 7602 summons, yet even this time should not
be conclusive. Referral should be the guideline and the actual purpose the
determinant.
Basing the privilege against self-incrimination on the sole issue of ownership versus possession degrades the nature of the privilege. An individual is
forced to seek professional accounting and legal assistance because of the
complexity of the tax law, having no intention for his records to be made
public. When the complexity of the law compels a person to divulge in confidence to another what may eventually be incriminating evidence, and this
confidential communication is not privileged, the person is compelled to incriminate himself. This is not to say that an extensive accountant-client

189. E.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864
(1953).
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